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The decade of the nineties has been marred by continued violence besetting the
former Yugoslavia. Today's technology allows people across the globe to read in the
newspaper publications and view, first hand, the violence emanating from this region of
the globe. The events unfold before us daily. A news crew ducks in the city of Sarajevo
while a sniper cuts loose on the civilians. Millions of refugees flee their homelands.
Soldiers round up civilians at gunpoint. Mass graves are unearthed. The fifteen bodies
of slain ethnic Albanians, victims of ethnic cleansing, send their message across the
television screen for anyone to find justice for this tragedy. As we sit and watch or read
these unsettling events, we sympathize with the victims' feelings of helplessness. We
wonder how many children of slain fathers have been left behind to defend themselves.
How many mothers have died shielding children from the shrapnel of exploding bombs?
How many children are left with no parents or family of any kind? The answer is too
many. The international community, meaning the govemments representing the member
states of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, has found a possible medium for
finding justice for the victims of Yugoslavia. The UN General Assembly ueatedin ad
hoc fashionthe International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to try
the individuals responsible for perpetrating crimes against humanity, genocide, and war
cnmes.
By examining the effectiveness of the ICTY, its strengths and weaknesses will
provide insight into an organization capable of establishing a tangible rule of
intemational law. In order to evaluate the success or failure, it is absolutely necessary to
trace the roots of trouble plaguing the former Yugoslavia. At the conclusion of this
paper, it is anticipated that the reader will understand in greater detail the complexities
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surrounding the violent events occurring in the former Yugoslavia. By becoming
familiar with the complexities and analyzinga key weakness of the ICTY, it will be
painfully obvious how ineffective the ICTY has been and will be if changes are not
immediately implemented.
The ICTY was established on May 25,1993. The United Nations (JN) Security
Council created the ICTY to prosecute war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. War crimes
committed include'osummary executions, torture, rape, arbitrary mass internment,
deportation and displacement, hostage taking, inhuman treatment of prisoners,
indiscriminate shelling of cities, and unwarranted destruction of private property."l
The ICTY is attempting to end the circle of violence by placing responsibility for war
crimes on the individual instead of blaming entire groups or nations. Reconciliation will
elude the former Yugoslavia unless the individuals responsible for the atrocities are held
accountable. 'No long-lasting reconciliation between ex-enemies, after all, can come
about without a proper accounting for war crimes; peace is built upon truth. Such a
process re-establishes confidence in the rule of law. It should also deter future killers."2
It is also the hope of the UN Security Council that the success of the ICTY will deter
future atrocities in the intemational community as a whole.
The ICTY has achieved its goal despite numerous setbacks. It has issued public
indictments on more than 70 individuals and several more sealed indictments. The
process ofjustice has been stalled because the ICTY has tried and convicted only one
person after five years. Thirty are in custody and awaiting trial.3 However, none of the
detained war criminals are top military or political figures ultimately responsible for
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implementing war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The former
Yugoslavia will never see change if it continues to be controlled by alleged criminals.
The ICTY cannot prosecute without defendants. Apprehending the indicted war
criminals falls under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Implementation
Forces (IFOR) stationed in the former Yugoslavia. However, the IFOR troops can only
apprehend the suspects if they happen to run into them on the street. The top political
and military leaders, which have been indicted by the ICTY, still have access to their
power. The war criminals either have the sense to stay out of sight or are surrounded by
large security forces.a
Special forces groups representing several nations have been brought in and had
limited success in apprehending the war criminals. The fear of casualties looms to large
to attempt a realistic, successful mission. Despite the lack of success, the Special Forces
military units are the best there is to accomplish the need of apprehending indicted war
criminals. However, casualties are almost a certainty. Politicians control the Special
Forces and are having a difficult time accepting a friendly death toll as a consequence.
There is no clear leadership willing to solve the ICTY's problem.s
The magnitude of this problem has several facets. The cycle of violence will
continue for future generations unless put to a stop now. By placing the guilt on
individuals instead of groups or nations, future retaliation between nations can be
significantly reduced. The ICTY will stagnate and loose its momentum if it cannot
follow through with the prosecution of the war criminals it has indicted. The
international community cannot stand idly by and let the former Yugoslavia continue to
repeat centuries old atrocities which have sparked both World Wars.
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The goals of any solution to the ICTY's problem should be the safest
apprehension of its indicted war criminals. The killing of any suspects, intentional or
unintentional, should be considered a failure. The local community must perceive the
West as an objective mediator for justice and not a bully exercising its own judgement
without a jury. The success of the ICTY will be measured by how many cases it has
brought to trial. The ICTY does not wish to prosecute without defendants present and
able to defend themselves.
The safety of all persons involved in apprehending the indicted war criminals
should also remain a key factor of implementation. Heavy casualties will only cause the
international community to become even more timid and indecisive. Good intelligence
will help give the upper hand to friendly forces. However, apleafor no casualties is
unrealistic. The consequences of violent action will most likely result in some casualties
no matter the training and skill of the people involved. Military forces know the
consequences of their career field. It is time the politicians begin understanding the
fundamentals of their career--making decisions.
The U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and the U.S. Secretary of
Defense, William Cohen, have made a verbal commitment to do whatever it takes to
apprehend war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. However, the only result is indicted
war criminals giving themselves up from the lower level of the decision making process.
The war criminals responsible for implementation need to be apprehended or the war
crimes will continue.
Radovan Karadzic is a prime example. He was the former Serb President but was
convinced to resign his position when the ICTY indicted him for war crimes. He still
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retains much of his power and control over the military and therefore has the needed
protection against his would be captors. The UN Security Council has made it a priority
to capture Karadzic. The members of the Security Council who have taken responsibility
for apprehending Karadzic fear the casualty rate in any attempt to apprehend him.
One mission was attempted but aborted at the last minute. Over 300 people were
involved in the developments of the mission and eventually led to a leak of intelligence.
General Wesley Clark, commander of all NATO forces in the former Yugoslavia, wanted
detailed information on the residence which Karadzic was staying on the night the
mission would be implemented. The intelligence side believed the requests were
unrealistic and believed the General was getting cold feet.
General Clark did not want any casualties and would not send any troops in until
assurances could be made. There are no assurances in the business of military conflict.
At the last minute, a local approached the NATO intelligence officials and revealed the
mission plan intended to capture Karadzic. The leak cancelled the mission immediately.
The reason for this waste of time and resources is simple--there were too many people
involved over a long period of time.6
It was a failure and embarrassment for the military forces involved and the
politicians whose diplomacy has only given confidence to the likes of Radovan Karadzic.
Diplomacy with the threat of force has been attempted but has thus far failed. The threat
of force has failed to materialize which makes diplomacy a lame duck. Indicted war
criminals that were responsible for giving the orders are aware of this and will continue
to challenge the West until a realistic attempt at military force is successful.
In any negotiation, it is understood that force is the ultimate recourse. It is the art
of diplomacy to keep the threat potential, to keep its extent indeterminate...For
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once power has been made actual, negotiations in the proper sense, cease. A
threat to use force which proves unavailing, does not retum the negotiation to the
point before the threat was made. It destroys the bargaining position altogether[;]
lor it is a confession not of finite power, but of impotence.T
Violence has to be anticipated in a diplomatic ultimatum. "To exploit it, is
diplomacy - vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy."s The indicted war criminals of the
former Yugoslavia have no reason to respect the diplomatic ultimatums issued to them by
the United Nations or any member of the international community because the threat of
force has not been followed through. Air strikes do not count for violent consequences.
They are ineffective and the proof is found in lraq, terrorist groups, and Bosnia itself. Air
strikes have not altered the course of action by countries, political leaders, or terrorist
organizations on a permanent basis. It only serves to entrench the enemy and further
their resolve.
A permanent solution must be obtained and the formation of the ICTY was a
credible step towards that goal. However, if it is not followed through to completion, all
future persons violating intemational law will do so with the confidence that there are no
consequences for their actions. The crimes detailed in this research should be motivation
enough for the intemational community to involve itself in facilitating a more permanent
solution. In attempting to eliminate the senseless violence, which has beset the former
Yugoslavia for centuries, it is crucial to understand the deep roots of ethnic strife that has
existed throughout Yugoslav history.
By understanding what motivates the intense hatred between the Croatians,
Serbians, and Muslims, the ICTY will be better prepared to achieve its goal of ending the
circle of violence and assigning responsibility to individuals rather than ethnic identities
or religious affiliations. It is not the intent of this paper to simply categorize these people
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as being prone to violence. However, violence has visited this region several times from
its 7s century origins to the present. What is important to realize in Yugoslav history is
that the historic violence reported, whether it is true or not, is used in the present to whip
up hatred of one ethnic group against the next. Why? So that the leaders who are
facilitating the violence can create a national identity giving the individual political
power and thus control over a geographic region and global recognition.
A Brief History of the Yugoslav Peoples
The roots of Yugoslav are found in three Slavic tribes that migrated from Russia
in the 7ft century. These Slavic tribes were the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. All three
tribes maintained a separate existence until December 1, 1918. However, King
Aleksander of Serbia changed that and announced the formation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Aleksander's Kingdom consisted of six republics (Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous
provinces of Voljvodina and Kosovo.e This kingdom was called Yugoslavia meaning
South Slavs. The attempt to uniff the Slavic people under one central authority was
something of a dream for all involved. However, there were and still are too many
conflicting factors to constitute a harmonious union.
By 1918, the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and French empires had all
played a hand at controlling portions the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from the outset of
their first migration to the region. In addition to the different empirical controls, religion
served to further divide the three tribes. The Croats and Slovenes were primarily Roman
Catholic. The Serbs were Orthodox Christians. Some of all three tribes converted to
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Islam during the Ottoman empires control over the area. Social differences also played a
role. Serbian society was peasant and patriarchal, lacking a superstructure, and largely
homogeneous. Croat and Slovene society had many attributes of a class society. Slovene
society also was more industrialized,possessed a strong German influence, and its most
wealthy citizens were foreigners.l0
The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were, for the most part, never given an
opportunity to discover and explore their own identity. Outside influence throughout the
centuries created the base for which these three tribes got to work with in 1918 in
forming a semblance of unity. The only remaining common denominator was language
but even claiming that was a stretch. Each tribe adopted a different alphabet. Despite the
overture of King Aleksander spouting unity, the formation of Yugoslavia was through
monarchical control with a central authority hidden beneath the fagade of Parliamentary
representation for the six republics and two autonomous provinces. Free expression was
still repressed and controlled.
The "Royal dictatorship" as John Lampe called it lasted until Yugoslavia's forced
involvement of World War fin which Adolph Hitler destroyed any semblance of unity
attempted by the "Royal dictatorship". After World Warl[, monarchy gave way to
Communism and Josip Broz Tito (of Croatian descent) was its new leader demanding
"Brotherhood and Unity"ll of the Yugoslav peoples. Despite Tito's break with the Soviet
Union, he remained in complete control. Tito suppressed violently any form of
nationalistic tendencies from any group in opposition to his central authority regardless of
ethnic origin. Religious practice and the press were controlled. Tito's grip on
Yugoslavia remained until his death in 1980.12
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The death of Tito saw the rise of political leaders with the freedom to pursue an
autonomous existence. Unfortunately, the people of Yugoslavia have been influenced or
controlled by foreign powers in some form or another from its origins leaving a skewed
or altered existence through time. What the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are reminded of
is the violent atrocities perpetrated against each other throughout their history. The
violence, which unfolded in 1991, has been justified as revenge against these past
atrocities. Under this auspice, each ethnic group would have the excuse they need to act
out violently against the other. World War II is an excellent example of this.
World War II War Atrocities
The war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and several additional acts of
violence occuring after the Yugoslav breakup in 1989 are not exclusive to the events
tragically unfolding today. Acts of violence very similar to what we are observing were
occurring during World War II, which continued a precedent for violence between each
ethnic group. The people of Yugoslavia have thus far been unable to forgive and forget.
Rebecca West explains it this way:
Nationalist from each group typically claimed that their own depredations had
been exaggerated, while those of the enemy had been played down. All parties
adopted the pose of victims rather than victimizers, and proclaimed that the
accusations against them were overblown and unjust.l3
Each ethnic group claims the role of victim versus aggressor. However, Lampe records
involvement of each ethnic group violently acting out against each other creating a Civil
War within the confines of a World War.la
Hitler attacked the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on April 6,1941. The Nazi-led
dismemberment of the first Yugoslavia destroyed nearly all the existing institutions. The
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Croatian Ustasa allied themselves with Germany. The Tito{ed communists joined
Russia. Britain courted the rest of Serbia and the Muslims were linked to the depleted
Ottoman Empire in Turkey. These alliances divided the region against itself creating the
arena for a Civil War.
As Lampe writes, the Ustasha attempted to create an o'ethnically pure Croatian
state from which Serbs, Jews, and gypsies would be permanently cleansed." He reports
that well over 300,000 Serb men, women, and children were killed carrying out the
Ustasa agenda. Serbian State Guards took part in a massacre of over 2,000 men and
schoolboys supportive of the Partisan resistance or Tito-led forces. The Muslims were
then allowed to loot and burn the city, which prompted the Partisan forces to summarily
execute any of its opponents whereas before they merely punished them.ls
It is important to understand that the violent acts occurring in World War II were
duplicated in World War I, the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 between the Serbs and the
Muslim led Ottoman Empire, and the Muslim landowners over the Serb peasantry during
Ottoman domination. These are only a few of the well known violent events marring
Yugoslav history. Each ethnic group has a plethora of victim-type historical events to
draw upon to excuse current violent retribution.
Rise of Nationalism
The rise of Serb, Croat, and Muslim nationalism, although evident in the past, has
never been more apparent than the events unfolding daily. It is the rise of nationalism
with the use of myth structures espousing a "Golden Age" which have been used by the
elite's of Yugoslav society to gain control and power. "What we have here is a
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chauvinistic culture in which the dominant objective of scholarship, education, literature,
and journalism is not truth but how best to support and advance nationalist myths."l6 Ivo
Banac speaks on the same issue by emphasizing Serbian historians revisionist work of
Yugoslavian history under Slobodan Milosevic.
It became an agency of aggressive national aggrandizement, clearly in service of
Milosevic's political program-the establishment of a strong and unified Serbia
that would, once again,be capable of dominating Yugoslavia and, failing that, go
its own way together with all the territories in which the Serbs lived, including
portions of Ct*tiu and most of Bosnia-Herzegovina.lT
The Serbs are generally recognized as the initiators of aggression for what is seen
unfolding in the former Yugoslavia today. Croats and Muslims have been more of a
reactionary, defensive front to Serb forces. Quite the reversal from Croat aggression
during World War II.
Serb and Croat ethnic groups subscribe to different mythic origins at the expense
to each other. The Serbs believe themselves to be the most ancient peoples. Kosovo was
and always will be sacred Serbian land based on the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. So
hallowed is the ground on which the battle took place that Serbian soldiers reportably
remove their shoes out of respect when crossing in order not to wake the dead Serb
warriors. Their claims to Kosovo come at time when the province's population
breakdown is 90% ethnic Albanians and l0o/o ethnic Serbs. Yugoslavia's Deputy Prime
Minister Vuk Draskovic explained on March 31,1999 on a MSNBC chat line that "all
Serbs would die for Kosovo."l8 Zeljko "Arkan" Razratovic, a notorious Serb
paramilitary commander and indicted war criminal by the ICTY for unspeakable
atrocities, had this to say in response to Kosovo: "We will defend our land of Kosovo,
t2
pure Serbian land. For centuries a Serbian land. So you (United States and NATO) will
have a hell of a time if you attack us, that I can promise."le
Serbs believe that their involvement and conduct in both World Wars was entirely
noble and justified. Any mention of inflicting suffering on others elicits a justified
response claiming past atrocities to the Serb people at the hands of the Croats and Turks.
"This culture carefully preserves the myth of Serbs as innately the most magnanimous of
peoples, straightforward and hospitable, naiVe and brave, an perpetually the victims of
Albanians, Croats, and many others."20 Croats have similar claims of elitism, and being
the unfortunate victims of violence at the hands of their neighbors.
Croats assert nine hundred years of Croatian parliamentary life. Croatia now
claims that Knin in northem Dalmatia, currently a capital of the Milosevic-backed
Serbian Republic inside Croatia, must be recaptured because it was once one of many key
cities of Croatian statehood. Croats believe themselves to be "as congenitally more just,
civilized, cultured, and democratic than almost any other people, especially Serbs."2l
Croats ignore Pavelic's Ustashi regime responsible for hundreds of thousands of Serb
deaths in concentration camps, by mass executions, and forced deportation.
According to Steven Majstorvic, Muslim myth and legend is largely non-existent.
He explains that Muslims have no ancient land claims to validate their existence.
'olnstead of historical records and oral history, the Bosnian Muslims will have access to
videotapes, and Benedict Anderson's notion of the printing press as a vehicle for the
imaging of identity has evolved to NPR and PBS."22 This does not mean that they do not
have a legitimate claim of existence to Yugoslavia. Muslim converts in the social system
built by the Ottoman Empire were the landowners and freeholders of Yugoslavia.
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They took advantage of this superior position by taxing the Serb and Croat
peasants, whom they regarded as second class citizens, mercilessly. This of course
created a source of resentment to be later avenged by Croat and Serbs insuring the circle
of violence continued. Majstorovic believes the Muslims are the "most free to pursue
their own vision of an ethnic identity. Without a Kosovo or a thousand years state to
guide them, they are in a Big Bang period of imagining their place in the world."23
Majstorovic has fallen prey to those manipulating the rise of nationalism. The
belief that Muslims are capable of pursuing their own ethnic identity is incorrect.
Muslim identification is not a matter of ethnicity; but rather, religious affiliation.
Muslims share, in large part, the same ethnic background as the Serbs and Croats. Being
Muslim is a choice of religious conversion. The Serbs and Croats, who are engineering
the rise of nationalism, wish the outside world to refer to the Muslims as an ethnic
minority separate from Serb and Croat origin. John Fine, a professor at Michigan
University, makes it very clear that the three groups in question (Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims) all speak the same language and share the same historical origin. Fine is
referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This region was the most diverse within the former
Yugoslavia with a slight majority falling to the Muslim community. Before the violence,
all three groups co-existed peacefully. The only differences were in their religious
affiliation. The Serbs are largely Orthodox and the Croats primarily Catholic. Being
Muslim is of course aparlof the Islam religion.2a
Islamic influences occurred as the Ottoman Turks were in control of much of the
former Yugoslavia. Fine indicates that the Ottoman Turks did not refer to ethnic identity
but instead religious affiliation. With Bosnia under Ottoman control, there was a
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considerable rise in Orthodoxy and Islam due to the out-migration of Catholics and the
conversion of Catholics to Orthodoxy and Islam. The reason for this is quite simple. The
Orthodox leader, the patriarch of Constantinople, resided in the Ottoman capitol and
therefore easily controlled. Catholicism was headquartered in Rome under papal control.
It is easy to understand an increased tolerance for Orthodoxy over Catholicism. [t must
be noted that conversions were happening quite frequently. Catholics were converting to
Orthodoxy and Islam while Orthodox Christians were converting to Catholicism and
migrating out of Bosnia. During this confusing conversion/migration process, Islam
enjoyed the highest new convert total. The emphasis of Fine is the new converts to
Islam. There did exist some inmigration of Muslims from the outside but the vast
majority of new Muslim residents were newly converted Serbs and Croats from
Orthodoxy and Catholicism.25 The realization that Muslim origins are based on religious
affiliation versus ethnic identity make evident the manipulation of nationalistic rhetoric
which casts the Muslims as an ethnic minority. The purpose of the Serbs and Croats is
"to depict the conflict as an ethnic war - to justifr their states' territorial expansion, .. .
and also to label it ethnic Muslim to stir fears of the Turkish past and of Muslim
fundamentalism."26
The rise of nationalism is not attributable simply to the use of myth and legends to
create a superior attitude of one ethnic race over another. There are many factors which
contributed. Nevertheless, the actions of Yugoslavia's intelligencia to rewrite history in
favor of political aims encouraging myth and legend as truthful accounts is the
unfortunate reality as presented by Banac in his historiographical study of Yugoslavia.
The results are seen on CNN on a nightly basis. These myths and legends provide the
l5
excuse of violence perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia under the fagade of retribution
and revenge as a defense mechanism or ancient land claims for ethnic cleansing and
genocide.
These excuses may seem founded in ignorance and bloodlust to outside observers;
however, to the people of what was once Yugoslavia, these are legitimate claims. They
appear as excuses to outsiders but reasonable explanations to those carrying out the
atrocities. This is not an attempt to excuse or justiff the violence but rather to set a
proper backdrop to the intentions of the ICTY. Majstorovic explains Walker Conner's
belief that the
. ..objective history of an ethnonational group is irrelevant for understanding the
critical subjective essence of ethnic identity.. ..It is not what is, but what people
believe is that has behavioral consequences. And a subconscious belief in the
group's separate origin and evolution is an essential ingredient of ethnonational
psychology.''
This concept is vital to understanding the role of the ICTY as the implement ofjustice.
The belief structures, established by the propaganda of various myths and legends, have
sunk themselves deep into Yugoslavia society and cultffe
Hatred in the Streets
Cvijeto Job documents funny but furious folk doggerels and speeches revealing
nationalist hatred in Yugoslavia. These were being sung on the streets on the eve of the
1990 civil war in Croatia and Bosnia. One from Belgrade went:
Comrade Slobo [Milosevic],
send salads,
There will be meat galore,
We'll be slaughtering Croats
t6
Another, from Zagteb, went:
Mother o.f God,
Queen of Croats,
Bring us back Ante Pavelic,
So we canflush out Serbs again,
Half put to lcnife,
half string up on the willows.
The integration of this ethnic hatred is illustrated in the interview between the
New York Times and Goren Ivanisevic, a then young tennis superstar from Split Croatia.
In the interview, Ivanisevic told how policeman in Australia, assigned as his bodyguards
after a death threat, showed him how to fire a machine gun. It was considered in fun but
the chilling quote oflvanisevic reveals a deep seeded hatred revealed to a shocked, narve
international community. Ivanisevic said, "They let me shoot a machine gun. It was
tough to control but, oh, it was a nice feeling, all the bullets coming out. I was thinking it
would be nice to have some Serbs standing in front of me."28
It is now understood that the roots ofhatred extend beyond the propaganda ofthe
intelligentsia community reaching the streets and reinventing itself in folk songs. The
ethnic strife has reached such normalcy in Yugoslav society that aprominent figure in the
international community could make an offtranded remark of killing Serbs. The ICTY is
hard pressed to produce the results it seeks because the atrocities, which are reaching the
international community, are too grievous to ignore.
Accounting of the War Crimes
The sexual abuses are especially hard to ignore and tug at our collective sense of
morality. Although morality is a difficult definition to apply on such a broad scale as
international behavioral expectations, it not difficult to accept that the rape and sodomy
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of children, as young as 7 years old, as inherently wrong. By October of 1992, the data
collected by the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina reported "14,000 women, girls and female children were raped"
by Chetniks.2e Female children as young as 7 and women over 50 years old were
sexually abused.
The abuse did not stop with rape. 'oAfter raping, they beat them up and massacre
and torture them as well as cut off their breasts, arms and genitals and extract their
intestines and burn them alive." Forced impregnation has been reported. Women after
their third and fourth month of gestation are released to ooGo and deliver Chetniks." This
is evidence of a 60-90 day detention of the female civilian populace. During their
imprisonment, they are raped, tortured and beaten. Those who are released are in a"very
difficult psychophysical condition. "
Women who are not detained in camps are kidnapped during the night and
returned in the morning. Mothers who protested were punished immediately. Any
resistance is met with severe violence. A village was rounded up and 8 of the young men
were killed immediately. They divided them into 3 groups and ordered the girls and
young women to remove their clothing. The females explained they could not in front of
parents, children and husbands. The Serb soldiers began beating them and removed their
clothing. The men who protested were immediately executed. The girls and young
women were raped in front of their parents, children and husbands.30
Displacement is a routine event along with looting and burning of homes. The
displaced residents, when able to retum home, commonly find their possessions looted
and homes burned to the ground. In March of 1993, the State Commission for Gathering
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Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina published a Diary of a
Chetnik. The diary records events occurring from June 5 -17, 1992.
The author is second in command of a Serbian military unit. The author describes
his soldiers as more concerned about looting the homes of displaced people than fighting
and defending themselves. Looting is very profitable to a soldier who is missing a
paycheck and not fed well. Stolen property is a means to obtain both quickly with no
resistance to endanger them.31
The author also describes ethnic cleansing. o'The actions starts next moming at
6:00 (...) We cleanse each house, one by one (...) Shots can be heard."3z It is obvious
what has happened and it is clear the author participated. Those individuals who were
not able to escape were murdered in their homes. These are only some of the many
atrocious crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. Cherif Bassiouni, the legal expert
on the five-member special UN commission to investigate war crimes in the former
Yugoslavia, explored the reasons behind the acts of violence.
Cherif Bassiouni believes the violence is created and excused by a "perversion of
psychiatry." He has compiled 80 hours of videotapes of violence. Recorded are
interviews of victims including al4-year-old Muslim girl describing how she was gang-
raped by Serbian soldiers who were once her neighbors. Also included are the
description of a hospital stormed and the sick and wounded evacuated. They were taken
to a field and shot, all294 of them. "Arkan" was responsible for this and so proud of his
work that he sent a copy of the videotape recording the massacre of a town to the British
Broadcasting Corporation. He was quoted as saying, "People can say I am oMr.
Horrible,' but I don't give a damn. I am proud, do you understand?"
l9
Bassiouni refers to two articles found in two unnamed French magazines entitled
"Psychiatry and genocide" and "The psychiatric conspiracy in Yugoslavia." The articles,
which Bassiouni refers to "details Bosnian Serb PresidentKaradzic's use of Raskovic's
theories to manipulate his people into acts of hatred for the political advantage of a
Greater Serbia." Dennis Breo, author of "Human Rights II" article found in the Journal
of American Medical Association, reports that Karadzic considered the late Jovan
Raskovic, Md, his mentor. Breo explains that Raskovic was the director of a major
Sarajevo hospital, where he abused electroshock and wrote The Mad People (his
psychological profile of the Balkan ethnic groups). Breo quotes Bassiouni as he reads
excerpts from the French magazine articles: o'Listen to this. It was Raskovic's idea
exploited by Karadzic, that since the -Muslims have anal-erotic personalities and are the
sort who love to amass riches, they are fair game for slaughter...since the -Croatians are
castrated and terrified of everything and unable to exercise authority, that it is up to the
Serbs to guide them."
Karadzic used these psychological theories to whip up hatred. Obviously these
theories are not responsible for starting the civil war, but they were instrumental in
excusing the violent acts. Bassiouni spoke to soldiers from each warring faction
(Croatians, Serbians and Muslims) and explained to them that they could not rape, torture
and kill innocent civilians. They replied, "Yes, but we are only retaliating...We must
defend ourselves."33 This nonsense is proof of Karadzic's effectiveness.
Torture, rape, inhumane treatment of prisoners and displacement of persons from
their homes are among the few examples, which have continued since the supposed end
of the war in the former Yugoslavia. The torture of prisoners continues. A survivor of a
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detention facility under Serbian control witnessed the torture of a man. 'oThere was one
guy hanging one meter off the floor at the wall. Ropes held him up there and on one side
there was hot water falling on one of his shoulders and on the other side there was cold
water and he was crying."34 Another witness described pregnant women, who were
visibly swollen with child, beaten for three days while a prisoner of a detention camp.
She died on the fourth duy."
Severe beatings are common in the detention centers. A witness described a man
so severely beaten he could not recognize for seven days that he was a neighbor. Another
man at the same place and time was hit directly in the eyes with iron knuckles for not
accusing someone else of a crime as ordered. Summary executions are commonplace.
The same witness above reported 24 executions in a three-day period. This is one
witness reporting from only one detention camp.36 The last four examples occurred in
1998. The victims were civilians.
The violence, which occurred, was done not against military targets and personnel
but against civilians including children. Statistics accumulate d in 1992 showed that 85oh
of the injured were civilians and only l5%o belonged to other groups and soldiers.
Children made tp l5%o of the total 85% injured civilians. These statistics were compiled
during the war. The war did not officially end until 1993 in Dayton, Ohio with the
signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. Despite the signing, the crimes against civilians
continue to this duy.t'
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The Importance of International Law
The violence against non-combatants gave the international community the legal
grounds to involve itself in what was originally considered an internal struggle or civil
war. As long as the combatants in a civil or intemal conflict adhere to the laws
established by the Geneva Convention of 1949, the legal premise for international
involvement would have been questioned. The Geneva Convention of 1949 establishes
the humane treatment of all persons taking no active part in the hostilities, which include
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms. Humane treatment involves
the prohibition of violence to life (including cruel treatment and torture), hostage taking,
outrages upon personal dignity, and mass executions. It also provides for the visitation of
an impartial humanitarian body such as the Red Cross.38 All of these provisions have
been violated in the former Yugoslavia. Croats, Serbs, and Muslims are all responsible
for grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention by the well-documented violence
perpetrated against each other.
The United Nations Security Council, by the authority present in Chapter 7 of its
Charter, determined that the activities occurring in the former Yugoslavia were
considered a threat to international peace and security. Chapter 7 provides the United
Nations the power to establish the means of resolving threats to international peace and
security. The ICTY was established in ad hoc fashion to try individuals for violations of
international humanitarian law. In order for the ICTY to be considered a legitimate court
of law, the principles of legality had to be established. Cherif Bassiouni explains the
legality of intemational law and how it relates to the former Yugoslavia. This is
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extremely important to understand because it is this foundation which supplies the ICTY
with the necessary authority to exist.
Bassiouni makes a clear distinction between national criminal law and
international criminal law. Murder, rape, slavery, assault, battery, kidnapping, forcible
confinement, robbery or theft all falls easily under most national criminal courts.
However, this alone does not make the crime arecognized international violation.
Crimes against humanity easily correlate to crimes recognized by national courts. The
problem is in creating an international element, meaning jurisdictional authority given to
the international community, within the framework of what are considered crimes against
humanity. Bassiouni calls the international element a'o'state action or policy,' the pre-
requisite legal element for ocrimes against humanity'."3e This author agrees with the
notion presented by Bassiouni that national legal systems are frequently unable to reach
those in control of state agencies by virtue of their positions. This unfortunate reality
predicates the necessity of intemational intervention due to the power and influence state
agents have over their respective nations.ao
Radovon Karadzic is a good example of this abuse of power. The ICTY
possessed the authority to indict Karadzic for crimes against humanity because he used
the Bosnia-Herzegovina govemment to perpetrate what is now considered to be crimes
against humanity. Because this is would be considered an intemational incident,
Karadzic is also indicted for crimes of genocide or ethnic cleansing based on the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The
convention states that "genocide is a crime under international law."4l Karadzic used the
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state to achieve goals ofethnic cleansing and therefore reaches beyond the scope ofhis
state's national law, making him responsible to the ICTY.
Technically or legally speaking, the ICTY is a legitimate authority to be
recognized. This could not have been achieved without the groundbreaking
achievements of the Nuremberg trials established in 1945 following the conclusion of
World War II. Although there are many questionable aspects behind the Nuremberg
tribunal, it did provide the basis for the evolution of international law as it is seen and
implemented today.
The precedent set by the Nuremberg trials
"The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so
malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored,
because it cannot survive their being repeated."42 Associate Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson said this in his opening statement to the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Trials took place under the Charter established in London
between June and August of 1945 by the representatives of the victorious Allied Powers
(United States, USSR, France and the United Kingdom). Joe Heydecker and Johannes
Leeb, authors of The Nuremberg Trial, claim one million Germans were placed on the
War Crimes Commission list as wanted criminals. However, the result was a mete22
German offrcials tried at the Nuremberg trial. Michael Scharff labeled the defendants as
a o'Who's 'Who" of the Third Reich.a3 In this sense, at least Nuremberg was successful in
obtaining the top officials responsible for the atrocities of World War II.
24
The events that prompted the formation of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945
occurred between 1930 and 1940. Concentration camps were established by the Nazi
regime to incarcerate without trial Jews, Communists, and any opponents of the Nazis.
The Nazis outlawed the Jews, took away their German citizenship, and made marriage
and sexual intimacy between Jews and German citizens a criminal offence. The Nazis
annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia, invaded and occupied Poland, Denmark, Norway,
Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium, and France; and then it "set in motion, 'the final
solution to the Jewish problem' by establishing death camps such as Auschwitz and
Treblinka, where six million Jews were killed."aa
As the Allied forces began pressing into Germany and an end to the fighting was
in sight, the Allied powers were faced with the task of establishing an acceptable
procedure for dealing with the surviving leaders of the Nazi regime. The "United
Nations," a term adopted by the Allied powers and22 other nations united against the
Axis powers of Germany,ltaly, and Japan, established the "United Nations War Crimes
Commission." The War Crimes Commission was tasked with the investigation and
collection of evidence against the Axis leaders. However, the representatives of the
Commission were divided on how to proceed. Britain, represented by Winston Churchill,
and Russia, represented by Joseph Stalin, wanted court martials and summary executions
to which Stalin supplied a list of 50,000 Nazi war criminals to be shot.as United States
President Franklin D. Roosevelt also supported the idea by a memorandum, which
supported Churchill's plans for the Nazi leaders and agreed to "concert with him a list of
names"46 for execution. Former plans radically changed with the death of Roosevelt in
April of 1945. The new U.S. President, Harry S. Truman, vehemently opposed the idea
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of summary execution. The U.S. was able to convince Britain and Russia that
establishing an international tribunal would serve several shared objectives. Scharf
explains the benefits of said tribunal:
First, judicial proceedings would avert future hostilities which would likely result
from the execution, without trial, of German leaders. Legal proceedings,
moreover, would bring German atrocities to the attention of the entire world,
thereby legitimizing Allied conduct during and after the war. Finally, such a trial
would permit the Allied powers, and the world, to exact a penalty from the Nazi
leadership rather than from Germany's civilian population.aT
This is where the similarities of Nuremberg and the ICTY are evident. The intemational
community's attempt to end violence existing in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates the
nearly identical objectives employed by the Allied powers in 1945.
The significance of Nuremberg can be found in its charter. The Nuremberg
Charter listed three categories of offences: 1) crimes against peace, 2) ww crimes, and 3)
crimes against humanity. These categories were, according to Roger Clark, loosely
related to the Geneva Convention of 1929 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. What
Nuremberg was attempting to achieve was individual responsibility for atrocities
committed. The 1929 Geneva Convention achieved this objective through the
recognition of international customary and treaty law. The Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928
used a much-cited sentence of, "Crimes against intemational law are committed by men,
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced."48 Although Clark points out the
discussion of valid legal claims is disappointing; he is quick to point out what Nuremberg
established. Clark is joined in his observation by Michael Scharf in that the offence of
crimes against humanity and the liability of the State for human rights abuses within the
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State's own borders had been firmly represented and accepted by the intemational
community.ae
The benefits of Nuremberg, which found there way into the ICTY, must be
tempered with the stark differences between the two. This plays a significant role in
understanding the potential success and limitations of the ICTY. The Nuremberg
Tribunal is generally referred to as oovictor's justice." The Allied Powers obtained an
unconditional surrender from Germany and set themselves up as what could be
considered defacto territorial rulers. They were the unquestioned victors of World War
II and ready to punish the atrocities that were carried out on its citizens. Nuremberg was
established by the International Military Tribunal and already had a majority of the
defendants in custody which indicates the ability of the tribunal to arrest as well as
prosecute. The ICTY was created, in this author's opinion, in the completely opposite
manner. Rather than create an institution with the ability to apprehend, detain, and indict
and then deal with the question of legality, the ICTY was created first on the basis of
legal legitimacy. However, in firmly establishing itself as a legitimate legal institution,
an implementation process was overlooked. The ICTY is not capable of apprehending
the indicted war criminals.
ICTY: A Legitimate Force to be Reckoned With?
The ICTY has been created by the most professional standards of legal precedent
Nuremberg started the world thinking about the need for justice in the wake of
humanitarian atrocities. The Nuremberg tribunal was successful because there was
nothing to stand in its way, nobody to question its motive and legitimacy. The
27
weaknesses of Nuremberg were recognized but in light of the overwhelming evidence
against the Nazi defendants for unthinkable crimes, motive and legitimacy were
overlooked to make sure that justice or, more appropriately, retribution was
accomplished. For the ICTY, there were no victors of war. The Dayton Peace Accords,
signed in Paris, may have officially ended the war but certainly not the violence that
continues against the civilian population. Dayton recognized no clear victor of the war,
simply a truce.
The International Military Tribunal established Nuremberg, while the United
Nations (UN) Security Council under Chapter 7 of the LJN's charter established the
ICTY. The legitimacy is founded on the adoption of the Nuremberg Charter by the uN
General Assembly in 1946.s0 The definition of war crimes found within Nuremberg's
Charter was later codified and elaborated on in the four Geneva Conventions of lg4g.sr
The definition of crimes against humanity was adopted by the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.'2 This gives the ICTY a
legitimate foundation established by the tIN and recognized by the intemational
community to levy justice-real justice.
However, in building a strong legal foundation, a major practicality was
overlooked or ignored. Gabrielle MacDonald addressed this issue while a guest of the
Common Groundradio program. She points out thatNuremberg had all of its defendants
in custody because they had the power to arrest. She goes on to say, "That's one of our
major problems of course, is that the Tribunal does not have the power to arrest
individuals. We rely upon the states to execute our arrest warrants. The prosecutor has
issued 75 indictments and we have only 8 persons in custody because states have not
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cooperated."s3 This may be simplifying the issue too much;nevertheless, the ICTY can
go no further without the defendants in custody to prosecute. To break down any other
would be weaknesses are a mute point. The ICTY will not be considered a force to be
reckoned with if the indicted criminals are able to scoff at the supposed power and
legitimacy of the court. There are still no realistic consequences for perpetrating
international crimes against humanity, genocide, or crimes of war.
Conclusion
With the creation of the information super highway, CNN, satellite innovations,
and many more techno-toys, the world has become much smaller. We as consumers and
participants of this technology are forced to digest the violence which invades the safety
bubble we find ourselves clinging to. In times past, it was easy to ignore the tragedies
which visited our brothers and sisters across the globe but not today. We see the trauma
unfold before us as it happens. The violent experience families have faced in the former
Yugoslavia is now my shared experience by a technological medium.
This is a good thing. The phrases "global community" or oointernational
community" is no accident. Trade barriers are slowing falling. Foreign investment is
increasing. Longevity is increasing. Infant mortality is decreasing. Industry is
expanding. The globe is becoming; however slowly, more homogeneous as we speak.
We could call this "global civilization." The advancement of society has increased the
notion of civility. By this it is meant, a moral undertone of what is right and wrong. As
we (the international community) watch the atrocities unfold, a majority of us feel that
this is inherently wrong. It is not necessary to reintroduce the horrible atrocities
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described in this paper. The intemational community is forced to react, to condemn, to
provide justice.
The world was faced with a similar situation following World War II. The
purpose of the Nuremberg tribunal was to implant in everybody's mind that the Nazi
atrocities were unacceptable to the international community. Consequences had to be
levied against those found guilty. Today, it is no different. The atrocities are
unacceptable to the global community. The ICTY was created to levy justice. It is
hoped, just as Nuremberg hoped, that by establishing a consequence for unacceptable
behavior the atrocities would be eliminated. The victims would be vindicated in a
"civilized" manner versus violent retribution to satis$ their hate.
The ICTY is certainly capable of ending the circle of violence that has plagued
Yugoslav history for centuries. However, the ICTY has come up against a significant
barrier. The ICTY is relying on the states, which were Yugoslavia, to apprehend and turn
over the individuals it indicts for crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of war.
The states are not cooperating. The ICTY does not have defendants to prosecute. For all
the legitimate legal foundation the ICTY was carefully established upon, it cannot
determine its own success. Unless this problem is solved immediately, the ICTY will be
an absolute failure.
Yugoslavia will never return to the peaceful co-existence of multiple ethnicity's
and varying religious background if the leaders of the respective states are continue to
possess the ability to implement programs of ethnic cleansing or continue to support the
crimes against non-combatants. The international community must not fail to recognize
that the civilian population is not only the victim of violence but also manipulation.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of peaceful coexistence among the Serbia's,
Croatians, and Muslims. John Fine, University of Michigan, believes that the only real
solution is the reuniting as the culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina once was. Fine provides
evidence of peaceful coexistence by the 3}-4}%mixed mariages.su This is why the
success of the ICTY is so absolutely crucial. The leaders who have been responsible for
the atrocities must be apprehended, tried and convicted. Without their manipulating force
influencing the people of Yugoslavia, it is hoped that the coexistence Fine describes can
be retumed to this region. However, Yugoslav history will never go away. Even if the
ICTY is successful in ending the circle of violence by targeting those individuals
responsible for the atrocities, will another individual with political aspirations be willing
to use the same manipulative strategies to gain power. Only the Yugoslav people will, in
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